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In November 1644, the ship captain Sebastiane Ferro arrived at the Tuscan port of Livomo with a cargo of wine. Even before requesting the pratica of the portentry for the purpose of trade-he asked to receive the exemptions of Livomo, "to be sure that in corning onto land he not be molested either in his person or in his goods for civil debts contracted in foreign states."
1 Technically, these exemptions were restricted to inhabitants of the city. Nonetheless, the Customs Office routinely granted them even to temporary visitors of what was Europe's premier free port, and in this case Customs Director Pandolfo Attavanti was happy to oblige Ferro. What happened next was therefore quite unexpected. While the regular governor was out roving the Mediterranean with the grand duke's ships, several creditors of Ferro persuaded the acting governor to clap the captain into prison, disable his vessel, and seize his cargo. Attavanti was furious. He declared that this violation of the port's liberties gave merchants a lot to worry about regarding their safety in Livomo. Captains ought to be protected from such outrages by the "public faith and the freedom of the port." Even in more restrictive places such as Genoa and Civitavecchia, ship captains were given a "golden bridge" in the general interests of commerce. The customs director feared that the attack on Ferro was symptomatic of a new approach by the auditore ofLivomo, the governor's chieflegal counselor. In the preceding months an Armenian and a Venetian who also ought to have been protected by the port's generous freedoms had also fallen victim to the auditore's zeal. "I don't know whether I have said too much," Attavanti apologized at the end of a rambling letter to the secretary of in Europe." 12 Livomo's example deeply influenced the spread of the institution.
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It is useful to identify four phases in the geographic expansion of free ports. The first was a Tyrrhenian period, roughly from 1591 to 1650. Goaded by the success ofLivomo, Genoa and the Savoyard ports ofVillefranche and Nice adapted free port policies to their needs. There followed an expansionary phase, roughly 1650 to 1740, when free ports appeared throughout western Europe and especially around the Italian peninsula. The most well known of these included Trieste, Ancona, Naples, Messina, Marseilles, Tangier, Dunkirk, and Althona. By the mideighteenth century colonial powers were creating a number of such ports in the Caribbean Sea, including in Martinique, Guadeloupe, Tobago, Jamaica, and SaintDomingue (Haiti). Later they spread to East Asia and North America. Thus free ports were first an Italian, then a western European, later an Atlantic, and ultimately a global phenomenon (table l ) .
Historians often place free ports in the context of centralizing states and relentless international competition. In his classic work, Louis Dermigny stated baldly that "the free port is a modem reality, created by and imprinted with centralizing states and the mercantilist orientation of their policies."
14 More recently, Thomas Allison Kirk has argued that the Genoese free port aimed to help the small Ligurian state stay politically independent and commercially prosperous in a Mediterranean dominated by large nation-states.
15 Scholarship on Livomo likewise portrays the free port as the creature of three grand dukes in three discrete instances: Cosimo I (the Customs Reform of 1566), Ferdinanda I (the Livornina of 1591/1593), and Cosimo III (the Customs Reform of 1676). Save for a reform 12 Francis Brewster, Essays on Trade and Navigation in Five Parts (London, 1695 ), 29. Geographical dictionaries usually remarked on Livomo's status as a free port, too, even when they withheld that moniker from other ports that claimed the title, such as Genoa. For example, Lucas de Linda, Le relationi et descrittioni universa/i et particolari del mondo, trans. Maiolino Bisaccioni (Venice, 1664), 40.
13 Alberto Caracciolo, "Il dibattito sui ' porti franchi' nel Settecento: Genesi della franchigia di Ancona," Rivista storica ita/iana 75, no. 3 ( 1963) : 538-58 ; Louis Derrnigny, "Escales, echelles et ports francs au moyen age et aux temps moderns," in Les grandes escales (Brussels, 1974) , 521-626; Josef W. Konvitz, Cities and the Sea: Port City Planning in Early Modem Europe (Baltimore, 1978) ; Jesper Meijling, "La lenta diffusione di un modello: Tl porto franco da Livomo a Marstrand nel settecento," Nuovi studi livornesi 17 (2010): . The free port is the forebear of the modem free trade zone (FTZ) and export-processing zone (EPZ). See Richard S. Thoman, Free Ports and Foreign-Trade Zones (Centreville, MD, 1956 ); Robert J. McCalla, "The Geographical Spread of Free Zones Associated with Ports," Geoforum 21, no. 1 (1990): 121-34; Jean-Pierre Singa Boyenge, "ILO Database on Export Processing Zones (Revised)," April2007, p. l , http:// www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2007 / 1 07B09 _80_engl.pdf.
14 Derrnigny, "Escales, echelles et ports francs," 522. (Bari, 1993) , 77-88. Ncm;.--since the term did not always appear in legislation, contextualized readings determine what counted as a free port. Some ports had their privileges revoked after more or less time; other.; saw their privileges fall into desuetude or vitiated by later legislation; still other.; experienced an expansion of privileges.
of 1643 that temporarily restricted privileges, the free port appears to have expanded progressively at these three moments.
16 This view descends from the eighteenth-century jurists of Livomo who first discussed the free port in historical terms. At least some jurists were aware that the story was more complicated than it seemed. One remarked on the "infinite amplifications and declarations" that constituted the free port and noted the distinction between "written law," on the one hand, and "particular orders, practice, and custom," on the other.
17 But like the historians who have followed them, jurists preferred to base their narratives on the grand legislation. There are serious problems with this approach. While it is easy to see purposive state action in the decision to construct port infrastructure and invite foreigners to settle in Livomo, the term "free port" was not even mentioned, let alone defined, in the chief legislation. It remained vague in both its sphere--did it pertain primarily to merchants or to their goods?-and in its detailed provisions.
Uncertainties about Livomo's fundamental laws caused periodic confusion, and bureaucratic procedures both formal and informal proved as decisive as legislation in shaping the free port. The Medici had no regular institutional channels with which to craft strategic policy or analyze the workings of their customs regimes. Instead, they delegated control over policy development to poorly supervised local officials. This "choice" was made without careful consideration but it fully partook of the larger institutional logic of the grand duchy.
18 Policy making by the periphery nonetheless provided an excellent mechanism for Livorno e Ia Toscana (1676 -1814 (Naple , 1998) 17 ASL, Govemo civile e rnilitare di Livomo (Govemo), 1025. Modem historians have likewise noted the gradual development of the free port by means of decrees or generous interpretations of the law, but they have nonetheless emphasized ducal initiative throughout the period from 1566 to 1676. The goal in this article is to explain why, as Baruchello put it, a "spirit of unlimited favor towards commerce" animated officials in Livomo despite changing conditions in the Mediterranean and the grand duchy (see Baruchello, Livorno e il suo porto, 125, 267, 292, managing Livomo 's unpredictable expansion in the seventeenth century. Local officials, bound to merchants by ties of collaboration, were responsive to the desires of the business community in ways that increased port traffic, promoted foreign settlement, and furthered freedom in the marketplace.
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At the same time that historians have seen free ports as "entirely a modem act," 20 they also have celebrated them as centers of cosmopolitan toleration in a Europe wracked by religious divisions and monopoly restrictions. Accordingly, historians have tended to accept the ideal definition of the term provided by the brothers Savary in their Dictionary of Commerce ( 1723). For them and their later readers, free ports were places where merchants of any ethnicity or religion were free to trade on equal terms and where storage and transit duties were norninal.
21 This definition obscures the question of the development of the free port as a set of practices and a discursive tool. The Medici grand dukes who crafted Livomo 's legislation and the merchants who settled there did not have the Savary definition in mind when they used the term "free port." A specific notion developed gradually in the first half of the seventeenth century. The practices examined in this article created a free marketplace open to virtually all comers, but a marketplace constituted by a thicket of bureaucratic intricacies. The complexities of free trade in Livomo helped spur radical legislation in 1676 whereby the grand duke eliminated import/export duties and imposed a uniform tariff for commercial services. Livomo helped invent free trade for all nations, but its path was winding and unpredictable.
This article has four sections. The first examines the evolution of the trading framework in Livomo from the customs law of 1566 to the celebrated Reform 19 By contrast, the Genoese favored a legislative path in their Republic's elusive goal of competing with Livomo. Guided by the expertise of the Casa di San Giorgio, which administered the customs and the public debt, the Genoese government crafted a new free port law every five or ten years to adjust the shortcomings of previous laws. The Genoese free port did not exert an important influence over the discursive or practical spread of free ports, however. Giulio Giacchero, Storia economica del Settecento genovese (Genoa, 1951 ) , pt. I ; see also his Origini e sviluppo del portofranco genovese (Genoa, 1972) of 1676. Section II analyzes the political institutions that made the free port possible, especially the practice of supplication whereby individuals lobbied local officials for ducal favors. It shows that the informational problems inherent in administering the free port had important consequences for policy outcomes. Section III argues that the policy process in Livomo illuminates larger problems in European political economy during the seventeenth century. Institutions played a critical though varying role in shaping economic discourse throughout Europe. A brief conclusion then highlights the implications of this study for our understanding of free ports in early modem Europe.
I. THE FREE PoRT AS A WoRK IN PROGRESs
Establishing direct ties with Spain for purchasing raw wool and with the Levant for selling finished textiles were long-standing ambitions of the Tuscan elite.
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Since the old medieval harbor ofPisa had silted up by the early sixteenth century, the Medici grand dukes needed to construct a new port to achieve these goals. They offered extensive privileges and made large investments in Livomo, then a backwater port ignored by the currents of international commerce. In 1566, Cosirno I reformed the town's customs administration. Although the reform was more a consolidation of prior arrangements than a novel tax regime, it enshrined the low storage and transit duties that would make Livomo an attractive place to do business. A decade later Francesco I commissioned the grand duchy's finest architect, Bernardo Buontalenti, to design a city capable of accommodating some ten thousand people. In the meantime, the grand dukes also built basic port facilities: a channel for connecting Livomo to the Amo River and a pier, fortified walls, and warehouses for storing grain or other goods. Francesco, following in his father's footsteps, also took measures to establish silk cultivation in Tuscany itself and to attract a range offoreign artisans to his realm. Francesco's industrial policy enjoyed substantial success, especially in luxury crafts_2 3 The grand duke's difficulty in luring private real estate investors to his new port slowed construction in Livomo, however, and his failure to secure a reciprocal trading agreement with the Ottoman Empire frustrated the regime's commercial goals. 26 Muslims did not come in large numbers, as it turned out. Protestants posed a more sustained challenge. Dissimulation among the Dutch and the English was high in the early decades of the seventeenth century as officials deliberately turned a blind eye to the spiritual affiliations of the city's inhabitants. Only when a religious matter threatened public order or relations with Rome did the regime intervene. Stefano Villani, "'Cum scandala catholicorum . . .' :La presenza a Livorno di predicatori protestanti inglesi trail 1644 e il 1670," Nuovi studi livornesi 7 ( 1999): 9-58.
27 Elena Fasano Guarini, "Esenzioni e immigrazioni in citta tra sedicesimo e diciasettesimo secolo," in Livorno e il Mediterraneo nell ' eta medicea (Livorno, 1978) , 56-76, and Fasano Guarini, "La popolazione," in Livorno e Pisa: Due citta e un territorio nella politica dei Medici (Pisa, 1980), 199-215. and the Tyrrhenian region. Over time, it grew into a central node for transMediterranean commerce as well. Livomo 's transformation from a minor Tuscan port into "one of the most famous places for trade in all Christendom," as the pioneering mercantilist writer Thomas Mun put it in the late 1620s, ultimately owed to global economic developments. 28 The crisis in Italian shipping, the production of cheaper textiles, and the growth of the Atlantic sphere created an opportunity for the major seafaring nations. Livomo was a perfect place for northerners to distribute their products as their markets in the Mediterranean expanded.
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Ferdinanda I took a vigorous interest in supervising the minutiae of the port's affairs. But after his death in 1609, the regime gradually scaled back its maritime ambitions and finally sold off most of the Tuscan galleys in 1647. In the meantime, privy secretaries more often enjoyed a free rein in managing administrative matters in Livomo, especially after Cosimo Il's premature demise in 1620 ushered in fifteen years of government by regency. These developments strengthened the role of bureaucratic decision making-not because privy secretaries could not exert central authority in any particular instance, but because ordinary administrative procedures made it costly for the central government to maintain constant vigilance as commerce expanded. In addition, the Medici regime lacked the theoretical and practical knowledge to direct their port project. Late Renaissance economic thought opened up a vast new sphere for intervention in commercial and industrial life, but it did not provide rulers with realistic assessments of how to adjust means to ends. 30 To move beyond a perspective focused on effective state action, then, it is necessary to pursue another trajectory to explain the elaboration of the free port: bottom-up bureaucratic processes.
The framework set up in the late sixteenth century could scarcely accommodate the crush of new immigrants, merchandise, and industries. The Customs Refonn of 1566 and the Livomina granted individuals general immunity from debts contracted outside the state (and before they settled in Livomo). Merchants also enjoyed the right to store goods in the port and to re-export them duty-free, so long as the goods did not change owners; and if goods were exchanged in Livomo, merchants paid reduced taxes depending on the commodity in question and its origin. Most business disputes that arose from these arrangements were adjudicated on the basis of a combination of Roman law, local statutes and regulations, and customary norms. In this respect, Livomo was much like other commercial centers. 31 Economic life in the free port also rested on a body of decrees, precedents, and practices that were bureaucratic in nature. Especially in the early decades ofLivomo's growth, the local bureaucracy had yet to settle into its standard procedures, and the extent of the city's liberties remained unknown. The requests of merchants generated piecemeal innovations that, taken together, contributed to the city's landscape of policies. Crucial steps toward consolidating a free-trade regime in Livomo included the decision to extend privileges to virtually all comers, not merely those who intended to settle in the port; to protect from seizure pirated goods purchased elsewhere and sold on the market in Livomo; to permit the free trade of both wholesale and retail goods despite the interests of local industry; and to extend warehousing rights indefinitely.
After unearthing a number of supplication decrees that were not precisely to the point, Customs Director Attavanti ultimately grounded his defense of Sebastiana Ferro on the traditions of the free port. If officials with archives of laws and rescripts at their disposal made broad appeals to the free port, it should be no surprise that individual merchants did the same in their supplications. A good example occurred when two Ragusan ship captains contracted to carry raw wool from Spain to Livomo despite owing money to some Tuscan subjects. They undertook to transport it "seeing that the liberties of the Port of Livomo have been observed for other people notwithstanding the interests of Tuscan subjects."32 As the ship drew close to Livomo, however, the Ragusans learned that their creditors intended to detain the ship to satisfy their debts. They requested 31 In Livomo, the Governor's Court heard most cases initially, although ones involving more than two hundred lire were easily appealed. Two other mercantile courts heard cases originating in Livomo, the Sea Consuls in Pisa (Consoli del Mare), and the Merchant's Tribunal in Florence (Mercanzia). These cases might end up at still another appeals court in Florence, the Ruota Civile. Andrea Addobbati, "La giurisdizione marittima e comrnerciale dei Consoli del 32 ASL, CGA, 2602 , vol. 2, f. 12, 10/06/1616 504 Tazzara a safe-conduct for trade to protect the pri vileges of the port from corrosion (as they put it) and to unload their cargo of wool. Even though the Ragusans ' request went against the letter of the city's privileges, which only protected people from their debts with alien subjects, the two were granted the exemptions ofLivorno. The dictates of law did not prompt the regime to grant such favors; on the contrary, they explicitly overrode the letter of the law. They were approved in order to increase the city's commerce and were known as agevolazioni or facilitazioni-little concessions that promoted commerce.
Merchants or ship captains cited the free port precisely because it was difficult to track down every privilege, exemption, or license, much less the spirit behind the letter of these texts. Their concerns were usually grounded in concrete business problems. For example, a basic question concerned the relationship between piracy and legitimate commerce. Two Corsicans, both citizens ofLivorno, were involved in buying pirated merchandise in Algiers and selling it in Livorno. 33 In October 161 0 they supplicated to recover goods sequestered at the request of the original owner, who claimed that his property had been seized by enemy corsairs at sea and brought to Algiers for sale. The Corsicans were granted the assurance that "vessels and merchants from that part of Barbary may not be harassed" on the grounds that "Livorno is free and open for all businessmen."34 Though framed as a supplication for personal safe-conducts, this decision set a precedent that was incorporated into the customs of the free port. By this act the regime indicated that it would not discriminate against goods purchased in corsair warrens like Tunis or Algiers. The grand duke might have remanded this case to the lower courts, which would have disputed the matter according to the concept of postliminy. 35 He did this when Christians claimed that his galleys had illegally seized their goods, as the direct sale of booty in Livorno was regulated according to strict legal principles. 36 But instead he decreed that the liberties of the free port would protect merchants and the goods 33 The two were Carlo Lorenzi and Rocco Manfredini. See Elisabetta Piccioni Lami, " ! Corsi a Livorno nel '600: Primo contributo," Studi livornesi 5 ( 1990): 71 -79. 34 ASF, Riformagioni, 28, f. 349, 06/ 19/ 1611. 35 Postliminy (postliminium ) concerns the right by which property seized during war or piracy is restored to the original owners. Postliminy was under debate in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, particularly over goods captured by Barbary "pirates," traded legally in Barbary territory, and sold to a European merchant. The tendency was for thinkers to legitimize such trade on pragmatic grounds. In Livorno it was legitimated on grounds of the free port. See Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy (Newport, Rl, 1988), 19-32; and Molly Greene, Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Mediterranean (Princeton, NJ, 20 I 0).
36 ASL, CGA, 2602, vol. I, ff. 456, 691 -96; vol. 2, ff. 383-84, 483, 515-17 . The claimants were usually Greek and their cases were sent to the Governor's Court rather than resolved by supplication. they purchased elsewhere, even in Barbary. 37 As late as 1645 the Corsicans' case was still cited along with thirty-four other memoranda important enough for the Customs Office to register in a specific book-a book which, however, officials seem not to have consulted very often. 38 The Reform of 1566 had granted merchants the right to store wares duty-free in Livomo for up to a year: the "liberal gift." As the city's commerce expanded, so too did the appetite for warehousing exemptions. During the reign of Ferdinanda I, merchants won the right to keep their merci sottili (low-volume, highvalue goods) in their own warehouses rather than under Jock and key in the customs house, as stipulated by law. 39 In 1627, several Livomo merchants supplicated to extend the "liberal gift" to two years, subject to an annual customs inspection. Just a couple of years later they supplicated again to make the gift perpetual in exchange for an increase in stallage fees; the measure preserved customs revenues while simplifying procedures. Merchants could now store their goods in Livomo indefinitely without paying duties on their import or export, so long as the goods did not change ownership. The movement from "liberal" to "perpetual" gift is an important marker of recognition of the city's role in the deposit and transit trade. It made warehousing exemptions central to the city's identity as a free port. The "perpetual gift" lasted only until the Reform of 1643 reduced the warehousing exemption to two years, although the merchant nations soon won the right to request its biennial extension (so that they enjoyed the same privilege, albeit with more paperwork and bureaucratic oversight).
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The supplications of merchant coalitions also shaped the relationship between industry and commerce in Livomo. In 1648, Carlo Antonio Pezzini supplicated for a privilege for the production and distribution of silk stockings. Forty-five merchants and shopkeepers sent a collective supplication begging the grand duke to deny Pezzini's privilege. Aside from the fact that the silk stocking industry would never amount to anything given the competition of established centers in Naples and Messina, they thought it would destroy the wholesale market for stockings in Livomo itself The customs director concurred with the merchants, remarking: "Given that this is a free port for all merchants alike, [ could not resu lt in any profit for the customs here.'><~1 The customs director argued that any privilege that hindered commerce in Livomo threatened its identity as a free port. In the end, Pezzini received only a privilege for the production of silk stockings. There were no prohibitions on sale or distribution. Yet again we see how Livomo's businessmen played a crucial role in defining the boundaries of the free port.
Officials were well aware that the liberties of the free port were ill-defined. In 1645, the auditore ofLivomo complained that there was no single repository of texts that defined procedures in the port. "But I have nothing else to say about the exemptions," he commented, "than to observe, that limitations have always been a seminary of disgust. " 42 This particular legal official was unhappy with generous interpretations of legislation. By contrast, the governor and customs director were generally committed to a broad and evolving notion of a free port. They settled most matters on a case-by-case basis. Attavanti had based his arguments in defense of Sebastiana Ferro on decrees lifted directly from supplications.
43
These were identical in form to the requests of men like the Corsican traders, the Ragusan ship captains, and Carlo Antonio Pezzini. In the last analysis, Attavanti's case rested less on decrees and more on what his predecessors in office had done. But many of their practices had originated in supplications, even if the decrees themselves seem to have been forgotten after the immediate decision.
Supplications-and the ducal decrees that answered them-were crucial for defining, even creating, the free port. Precedents were confusing and not readily available. As a result, the free port remained a flexible concept that officials and merchants alike deployed strategically in their supplications. Over time this practice created a way of doing things in Livomo that constituted what contemporaries meant by a free port, namely, the protection of merchants, ship captains, and their wares from arbitrary government action and the right of traders of any nation or ethnicity to do business on equal terms. The Ferro episode and others in the mid-seventeenth century invented a tradition based on these practices. It helped create a body of authoritative texts of the free port whose centerpiece was the Livomina.
The preference for reactive, ad hoc policy making bequeathed a mass of practices that made free trade in Livomo an administrative labyrinth. The Medici regime became aware of this problem as it shifted its interest in Livomo from commercial and industrial goals to meeting the fiscal needs of the state. the liberties of Livomo in his search for cash. His Reform of 1643 increased transit duties on most goods and shortened the warehousing exemption. 44 This new law did not set out to foster bureaucratic simplicity, and Livomo's merchants continued to enjoy a favorable trade environment thanks to intimate ties with local officials (see below). Nevertheless, it shifted the focus of policy discussions from particular provisions or tax rates to the general administrative framework for trade. Rather than simply urging tax reductions, which would have been unwelcome to the fiscally oriented grand duke, the foreign merchant communities began to object to the entire regime of particularistic liberties. They sought to extend the free port by simplifying administrative procedures on a systematic basis. It is no surprise that when a new reform finally arrived in 1676, it took the form of a fictive supplication whereby foreign consuls proposed a new tax regime. In fact, the "supplication" was the product of intense negotiations between the merchant communities and top advisors to the young Grand Duke Cosimo III. The Reform of 1676 eliminated ordinary taxes on imports while imposing an elevated but uniform stallage tax, the fee paid to house goods in Livomo. Merchants paid the stallage fees only once. Thereafter, they could store, trade, or export goods without further payments or bureaucratic oversight. Contemporaries were duly impressed. The French traveler Jean-Baptiste Labat marveled in the early eighteenth century:
Each parcel pays two piasters to enter, whether it contains silk or paper, whether it weighs one hundred pounds or fifteen hundred: it always pays the same duty. It is therefore a place of enormous parcels. Merchants take care to go aboard [ships] and to make one pack out of two, three, or four. They count them when passing through the Customs House without weighing them, without estimating how much they are worth, and without any of those annoying visits that one so often finds in other places. You know exactly what you have to pay, you pay it, and you' re done. 508 Tazzara grand duke did not like the capricious way officials appeared to reign over the institutional jungle of the free port. For merchants it amounted to a substantial reduction in transaction costs. The Reform of 1676 crystallized the notion that a true free port could charge only for commercial services such as warehousing or harbor use, not import duties. But it was motivated largely by an appreciation of the practical benefits of administrative simplicity in a city where free trade had developed with little central planning, poor theoretical guidance, and collusive relations between merchants and local officials.
II. SUPPLICATIONS AND THE COMMERCIAL CLASSES
Like monarchical power elsewhere in Europe, Medici rule rested on a process of bargaining between centers and peripheries. The grand duke respected the traditional privileges of his territory's governing bodies while overlaying them with supervisors that enabled him to intervene in the judicial process, balance local interests, and control finances throughout the state. In many ways, these policies were a continuation of those that developed under the Republic. What changed was the introduction of a Medici court apparatus and the bureaucratization of governance in the form of a larger administration staffed by permanent officers. 47 Supplications are a case in point. In the fifteenth century, rural communities presented their petitions to the Florentine government in person via oratores. In the mid-sixteenth century, Cosima I began personally handling written supplications to provide equity to his subjects. After a few decades of princely intervention, the growing Tuscan bureaucracy replaced the direct attention of the monarch with a system of rules, precedents, and more or less formalized practices.48 Local officials often controlled the pace and, in practice, the outcome of the supplication process. And while many of the dispensations the regime granted lay squarely in the criminal, political, and military spheres, others had commercial, fiscal , or industrial implications. The supplication was an important conduit for introducing novel procedures or clarifying older regulations. In Livomo, this form of state intervention tended to extend rather than limit freedom of trade.
The supplication process was a key dynamic that ordered relations between center and periphery in Tuscan political life. Historians have focused on the mediation of local officials as they bargained or negotiated interests between the localities, which were intent on preserving their autonomies, and the grand duke, who was concerned with securing obedience and with fiscal matters. By contrast, scholars inspired by neoinstitutional economics have concentrated on political bargaining at the center when they investigate early modem politics. 49 They have largely ignored administration in their examination of relations between monarchs and elites. 5° Studying the working conditions oflocal institutions helps historians incorporate information flows and bottlenecks into our understanding of systems of territorial power in the ancien regime. Although officials did indeed "mediate" and "negotiate," their capacity to do so was determined not by their position relative to the center or periphery but by their ability to manage and overcome the informational difficulties inherent in administering Livomo. Even when documentary precedents existed, neither ducal secretaries nor local officials found it easy to retrieve information from their archives (or from reality, for that matter). When making decisions, officials often had no sensible choice but to rely on individuals who had a stake in the outcome. The passive nature of the system, in which suppliants took the initiative in framing requests, further diminished the government's role in directing ordinary business. These factors stacked the cards in favor ofLivomo's merchants, artisans, and ship captains.
Princely regimes in sixteenth-century Italy found supplications a potent vehicle for affirming their status as absolute rulers and exercising munificence. An integral element of European political theology, the practice of supplications originated in a judicial context and was used to overturn decisions. 5 1 Whereas appeals were founded on strict procedural justice and ius commune, the supplication was founded solely on grace. In the sixteenth century the practice evolved to allow intervention in other realms as supplications were used to request patronage, propose commercial or industrial monopolies, and raise complaints. A burgeoning contemporary literature urged princes to be generous in bestowing their favors on subordinates. Baldassare Castiglione praised princes who were "liberal" in dispensing graces on their subjects. 5 2 For once, the virtuous counsel of humanists served the interests of princes. Supplications enabled rulers to superimpose their power over courts and communal governments while satisfying the demands of their subjects, especially the poor and weak.
Supplications were sometimes heard in voce, but the practice as a whole was a written substitution for holding an audience.
53 Virtually every bureaucracy in Tuscany had a collection of supplications, which run into the thousands of volumes. Other regimes also established regular channels to cope with the sheer 51 Although the supplication has deep roots in the ancient world, the practice only (re)assurned bureaucratic dimensions in the papal chancery of the fourteenth century. It then spread to other Italian courts where it enabled upstart dyna ties such as the Scaliger of Verona or the Pepoli in Bologna to gain authority over communal institutions. Franco Bartolini, "Suppliche pontificie nei secoli XIII e XIV," Bullettino dell'fstituto storico italiano p eril medio evo 67 ( 1955) ; Paola Repetti, "Scrivere ai potenti: Suppliche e memoriah a Parma (secoli XVI-XVIII). Lo stato, Ia giustizia, Ia supplica," Scrittura e civiltd 24 (2000) Managing Free l'raae tn ~:.any JVJoaern c-ur up~.;; .) 1 1 number ofrequests. 54 The supplications exploited in this study were composed in the third person and generally did not bear a signature, date, or place of composition. They were probably drafted by a notary or scrivener who copied from a formulary. From there, the supplicant found an official or ally who transmitted his request to the ducal chancellery. The documents usually contain the name of the supplicant, his town of origin or residence, the nature of his request, and a brief summary of the facts . 55 Thanks to their abundance and formal characteristics, supplications are ripe for quantitative analysis. Unfortunately, these same generic conventions make it difficult to get at the realities they purport to represent. Formulaic language is used both in the relation of facts and in the request for grace. In addition, even detailed supplications contain the fictive elements common to legal cases. 56 Accordingly, most scholars have shied away from a quantitative study and focused instead on supplications as a rhetorical form of communication between subjects and sovereigns. They were vehicles for conveying grievances and demanding redress.
57 In Livomo, however, the official investigation (informazione) also exists alongside supplications and offers a further means for contextualizing requests. When read in light of other evidence, a quantitative study provides insight into decision making in Livomo as well as a window upon social and political realities. 54 For instance, the Archivio Segreto Vaticano lists 7,365 volumes in its Registra supplicationum. The French collection knowns as the Tn\sor des Chartes in the Archives Nationales contains some 9,500 letters of remission for the years 1523-68. Philip II answered no fewer than thirty to forty supplications per day. Cecilia Nubola, "La 'via supplicationis' negli stati italiani della prima eta modema (secoli XV-XV1ll)," in 57 Paola Repetti does perform a quantitative analysis, although she lacks the rescripts and the informazioni on which I draw. Repetti , "Scrivere ai potenti," 295-96, 312. For this study I examined 772 surviving supplications from the two chief bureaucracies in Livorno: the Customs Office (n = 173) and the Governor's Office (n = 599) . Their officials reported directly and almost daily to a privy secretary on a variety of requests pertaining to econorrtic life. My source selections were conditioned by the surviving material and, where material was abundant, the beginning and end of reigns; the figure for the Customs Office is so low because many of the documents in its archive were destroyed in the late nineteenth century.
58 I coded every supplication into one of twelve exclusive categories: privilege, exemption, license, safe-conduct against specific debtors, general safeconduct to trade in the port, contract enforcement, fine or assessment revision, grant (requests for jobs, pay raises, etc. ), abuse report, judicial, administrative, and miscellaneous. I use the term "economic graces" to describe the first seven categories because they directly shaped commercial and industrial life in the port.
59 Of course, other graces rrtight have had econorrtic consequences (such as the court cases of merchants), but they were <lisposed of according to a judicial or political logic.
58 The documents come from: ASL, CGA, 2602: 1592-1629 (n = 408); ASL, CGA, 2603: 1640-48 (n = 148); ASL, CGA, 2608; 1680-82 (n = 43 ); ASL, Dogana, 3: 1648-53 (n = 173). While we have no reason to believe that the run of documents is complete, particularly for the earliest periods, supplications were conserved because of their importance to the chancery in establishing precedents. If we cannot be sure of having access to all of the supplications of a given period, at least we can be confident about the relative importance of those that do survive. I read only three years of the Governor's Office records from the 1680s because it was evident that supplications dealt almost entirely with housing and judicial matters. Note that the customs records between 1648 and 1653 seem relatively complete. 59 Privileges were requests to be the exclusive producer, distributor, or tax farmer of a good. Exemptions were requests to avoid paying a tax, to receive a lower tax rate, or to get permission to engage in some form of economic activity without paying a tax. Licenses included permission to engage in economic activity while nonetheless paying the usual taxes (e.g., privateering patents). Specific safe-conducts protected individuals from prosecution by a specific list of creditors. Bankrupt merchants usually requested such safeconducts to ensure orderly repayments to creditors or to protect themselves from malicious creditors. The general safe-conduct protected individuals from any civil debts contracted outside Tuscany or with non-Tuscan subjects. They were the equivalent of " taking the exemptions" of Livomo and were sometimes requested by potential immigrants, often redundantly. Contract enforcement supplications were requests for the government to enforce a contract, compel payment, or settle a debt. These were often efforts to circumvent the ordinary course of justice, as normally the governor or the Sea Consuls in Pi sa would hav.e .heard such cases. (I also placed requests for enforcement of judicial decisions in the JUdtctal category.) Assessment revisions were requests to have an assessment or fine reduced or an extension on payment. The majority of these requests were supplications to the .customs Office asking for an extension on tax dues or (for smugglers) a penalty reductiOn.
Supplications in Livorno largely served the commercial classes. Individuals making requests came mostly from the mercantile ( 4 7 percent) and artisanal (17 percent) sectors (table 2). Only 10 percent came from occupations a~soci ated with maritime life-ship captains or owners, petty boat operators, manners, and the like. Few of the city's teeming poor supplicated. The presence of laborers and small-time mariners is modest compared to the richer, much less numerous mercantile sector. Perhaps the supplications of the poor were less likely to survive or less likely to record their occupations than those of higher status. 60 At any rate, it is clear that the commercial classes found it possible to adapt the system of supplications to their needs. About 45 percent of the cases handled by the Governor's Office, and nearly 80 percent of the cases handled by the Customs Office, dealt with the economy (table 3) . Remaining business largely pertained to judicial or housing matters. 61 Although both offices dealt with requests for privileges, exemptions, licenses, and safe-conducts, the policing of economic life lay in the hands of the governor. It was his office that enforced contracts, handled requests for safe-conducts, and managed court cases. Only in cases of penalty revisions did the two offices share the burdens of policing, since both bodies could levy fines under certain con<litions.
62 A practice originally instituted for facilitating justice and empowering the poor became, in Livorno, a tool for manipulating economic life. The regime had a marked preference for granting supplications. Out of 639 supplications with known resolutions, the regime granted 67 percent (table 4).
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At a basic level, the desire among European rulers to exercise their generosity explains this finding : Natalie Zemon Davis found that over 93 percent of pardonseekers at the Paris Conciergerie between 1564 and 1580 won the king's grace 60 A word of caution is in order. The monikers mercante, negotiante, and so forth found in the supplications were not direct expressions of social reality. No doubt many who did business in Livomo arrogated the title of mercante without recognition by their "peers." Nor do the words distinguish between the big wholesale merchants and smaller-scale operators. But thanks to the process of investigation described in the text, supplicants had to make their designations plausible or risk being exposed as frauds.
61 By contrast, I have found little evidence that supplications were a primary vehicle for managing the port's religious life. There are a few examples, e.g., ASL, CGA, 2602 , vol. 2, f. 249. But in general, urgent religious issues could scarcely be decided by means of supplications because of the potential involvement of the Holy Office. See the Sainthill episode in Villani, "Cum scandala catholicorum," 9-13. 62 See Marcella Aglietti, I governatori di Livorno dai Medici all ' Unita d' ltalia: Gli uomini, le istituzioni, Ia citta (Pisa, 2009) . 63 The figures break down to an acceptance rate of 85 percent for the Customs Office and 61 percent for the Governor's Office. The lower proportion for the Governor's Office is accounted for by instances in which the grand duke remanded a supplication to the governor's own court. At that point they become ordinary judicial cases. NOTE.-Businessmen include mercanti, negotianti, and sensali/mezzani. Shipowners or captains include those who described their vessels as navi. Those who used terms for small craft such as fewi were classified as petty shipowners or mariners. Artisans or shopkeepers were those who described th emselves as practicing a craft, maintaining a bouega , or engaged in the retail trade. Professionals were typically doctors or lawyers.
for homicide.
64 But other processes also account for the high acceptance rate.
First, supplications were drafted in a stereotypical manner that reflected the conventions of the genre and the known preferences of the regime. The merchants of Livomo were well aware of the grand duke 's standards for granting safeconduct from debt, for instance. Second, there is abundant evidence for "preselection" whereby individuals lobbied with local officials before submitting their requests. The high approval rate marks the success of officials in mediating affairs in the port by vetting requests, lobbying for measures they liked, and blocking proposals they disliked. It does not represent the efforts of merchants and artisans in Livomo to overstep the authority of loca l officials by appealing to the central governrnent. In most cases the grand duke and his secretaries had no knowledge of a matter until a supplication brought it to their attention. It was then delegated back to Livomo for investigation. Although supplications were a princely institution, they reinforced rather than undermined the power of the local bureaucracies.
.
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Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 52. Davis focused on supplications for capital cnmes, whtch had dtstmct procedures that differed substantially from practices in Livomo: Most Important, the French courts conducted their ratification process acco rding to JUdtcta1 norms (tfnot procedures) , whereas the investigations I studi ed in Livomo were conducted by burea ucrats according to the nom1s of their offices. fbid ., 8-11 . Gentlemen, merchants, and artisans were effective at arranging their graces and privileges before the formal submission of a supplication. This "preselection" helps explain the high rate of approval I have observed. When the English refugee Sir Robert Dudley wanted a privilege for his new method of dyeing silk, he wrote to the governor of Livomo to settle his supplication ahead of time. 65 Another official discussed the safe-conduct of a gentleman from Padua with a privy secretary before drafting the supplication. 66 The preselection process was part and parcel with the traffic in personal recommendations, and it was common for officials to use a form of the word "recommend" when forwarding a supplication.67 As a result, they were reluctant even to accept supplications of which they disapproved, or which they did not find convenient for the grand duke. The assistant director of customs wrote to one secretary, "I've done my best not to trouble Your Lordship about the Netherlander who is owed money by those old butchers, but he has been so insistent that I could not escape forwarding his memorial." 68 Failed supplications did not generate a large body of rejections because many died in tran it or got lost in the bureaucratic shuffle.
Supplications in Livomo often became public knowledge. There was no pretense of secrecy, partly because supplicants handed their requests directly to the governor, the customs director, or one of their underlings to transmit back to Florence. 69 These men read and discussed supplications before sending them ~long. But the practice of information gathering after submission of a supplication was public i.n a.more direct sense. If the grand duke asked the governor to evaluate a su~phcatiOn, ~e governor sent one of his lackeys through the marketp~ace Iookmg for the mt~rested parties. For instance, when the commissary of L1vorno needed to compile a report on the alabaster industry, he sent a man to talk w~th the privilege-holder Innocentio Nerucci. Nerucci's shop was always shu.t ~p ,~1ght,. and eventually the commissary himself decided to pay the artisan a VISit: Passmg by I asked a mason who was working there where the master of the w~r~shop was, and he told me that he had gone to the fairs. Apparently InnocentJo IS the type of man who works only when he has to. " 70 Livomo was small. Most business took place in the Piazza Grande, in the government offices that flanked the piazza, or in the nearby dockyards. In addition, officials were not the only people flitting to and fro asking questions. The city's scores of brokers who. negotiated sales between wholesale merchants were also conduits of news.
In LI~or~o, there were few barriers to the rapid circulation of information about supplicatiOns or commerce more generally. The information-gathering process and the publicity it generated minimized the tendency for supplicants to make patently false claims in their requests. A few did not resist the temptation to lie, however. The debtor Michele Tilche asserted that most of his creditors supported his supplication for safe conduct, but his request was denied after officials di covered during investigation that Tilche had larded his petition with the names ofnoncreditors. 71 This example is significant because safe-conducts were routine business in Livorno, and it shows that even simple supplications received a measure of direct examination. Requests for privileges, licenses, and exemptions triggered more thorough investigations. I have found few instances in which officials reported outright lying in supplications. Of course, successful liars would be impossible to detect. But the practices of information gathering made lying difficult.
Although it is impossible to estimate how many supplications were stagemanaged, it appears that prescreening in Livorno was less effective in conflictprone situations. Requests for privileges, contract enforcement, and judicial interventions were denied more often than other kinds of supplications-acceptance rates were only 43 percent, 26 percent, and 50 percent, respectively. 72 In these cases, conflicts of interest were likely to prove problematic because they involved other parties. Exemptions and licenses could be granted to one individual without affecting others (except indirectly). By contrast, exclusive privilege antagonized people who were already producing or dealing in a good. For instance, Giulio Romano's proposal to create a privilege for weighing the grains used by the Cathedral Workshop (Opera del Duomo) was denied on the grounds that the Customs Office's corporate stevedores already enjoyed that right by custom. In cases of contract enforcement, the regime strong ly preferred the judicial process over direct intervention. Even when a baker asked for a mutual friend to adjudicate over payment from a merchant who was supposed to invest in his shop, the grand duke preferred to follow the ordinary course ofjustice.
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These norms of equity were a function of the judicial legacy of the supplicatory process. According to one French jurist, established interests were ipso facto legitimate and could not be infringed upon in adjudicating supplications. This principle lay behind the process of investigation and consultation conducted by public officials. 74 Taken as a whole, the supplications suggest that a creative period in Livomo's ?olitica_l economy came to an end by the 1640s. Sufficient sources for comparIson exist only for the Governor's Office (table 5) . In earlier decades, the governor dealt with a great variety of supplications. The uncertainties posed by immigration, new commerce and industries, and rampant piracy all required his attention.
75 The practices associated with the free port also became increasingly regular thanks to the institution of supplications. Informal traditions based on older decisions obviated the need for innovative economic supplications. As a result, more of the governor's business was occupied with judicial matters or safe-conducts against creditors. Supplications were more often remanded to his court rather than decided by the grand duke. The simpler profile of requests by the 1640s reflects the changed needs of Livorno as the free port became an institutional reality. In its early days, the system of supplications revolved less around judicial affairs than around economic matters. But the Customs Office and the Governor's Office gradually amassed a body of practical knowledge, documented precedents, and assumptions about the port that facilitated free trade in Livorno. By the 1640s-the period when Attavanti declared that "the custom is that ev~n our enemies the Turks have enjoyed and continue to enjoy the freedom of thts port"-the system of supplications was routine rather than innovative.
The supplication system allowed the grand duke to intervene when he wished w~ile_allo~in~ for the general reign of customs and consensus. My study of supplicatiOns mdicates, however, that in virtually every instance the regime follow_ed the recommendation oflocal officials. This was true for both complicated busmess and mundane matters, for which the grand duke or his secretary simply wrote non altro ("not otherwise") or cosi sifa ("do it this way") at the end of the official commentary.
76 It goes without saying that these local officials were not disinterested analysts of commerce, committed ideologically to norms of free trade. Except for the auditore of Livorno, a virtually all of the port's top supplicationi_bus~ seu errorurn propositionibus ' di Pierre Rebuffi ( 1487-1557)," in Forme della comu~1cazwn e poilt1ca, 35-51. The juridical nature of what today we would call an adrnmts?"attve body was typical of ancien regime approaches to governance. See Luca M~on and Bernardo ~ordi , Storia del diritto amministrativo (Rome-Bari, 2001 ).
The arc oflegtslatiOn confirms thts chronology. Ferdinanda I and Cosimo II issued a we~ter of laws and decrees for regulating the minutiae of economic life in Livomo. This legtslahon was often a response to uncertainties in the current framework rather than a novel policy departure. Lorenzo Cantini, Legislazione Toscana raccolta ed illustrata 32 vols. (Flo~~ce, 1800-1808 officials hailed from the Tuscan and especially the Florentine patriciate. 77 In their memoranda they sought to affirm their loyalty to their superiors and to safeguard their own political or financial interests. Their decisions nonetheless created a freer marketplace. In part, that outcome depended on supplication procedures and on poor monitoring from Florence. At a deeper level it was owing to a fundamental solidarity between merchants and officials in Livorno. Officials relied on merchants for information when investigating a supplication, as we have seen, but they also secured merchant cooperation in judicial cases and in managing tax collection. Customs duties in particular posed problems, as the policies associated with the free port complicated rather than simplified procedures until the Reform of 1676. Merchants paid duties not upon entry of their goods but only upon their eventual sale or re-export. Officials therefore had to monitor wares in storage as well as all marketplace transactions. The bookkeeping demands were formidable. As Attavanti put it, speaking of why it was unreasonable to settle all outstanding accounts in December, "that order was issued when the port of Livorno was still at a tender age, when com-77 Among governors, the outliers were Giovanni Canaviglia (from Naples) and Giovanni Manoli Volterra (a Greek Uniate). Among customs directors, Paolo Poltri and Francesco Terriesi were of relatively modest origins. Many subordinate customs officers were also from important families . For the list of officeholders I have consulted ASF, MM, 4 I 4, Niccolo Arrighi's Teatro di Grazia e di Giustizia, ff. 99-102, and Aglietti, 1 go verna tori. I relied on Litchfield's list of the Florentine patriciate (Emergence of a Bureaucracy, to determine the status of an officeholder. merce was just getting started, and it was easy for the customs officer to fulfill the regulation punctually. Since then business has always increased-to the benefit of Your Highness-and as a result it has become difficult even for previous customs officers to observe the full rigor of this law." 78 Opportunities for defrauding the customs were rife in Livomo, and officials went out of their way to cultivate good relations with merchants-in part to ensure the orderly payment of dues. Official collaboration with merchants readily slipped into collusion. Merchants had three general incentives for skirting the law: they wanted to minimize the time their wares or ships spent in quarantine; they wished to pay fewer taxes on goods they imported or sold in Livorno; and they ought to smuggle their goods beyond the customs cordon that separated the port city from the Tuscan hinterland. Officials were willing to oblige them on all three counts. Quarantine patents were a salable commodity in Livorno despite ongoing efforts to reform the Health Board that regulated acce to the port. 79 Moreover, officials frequently turned a blind eye to merchants who skimped on paying their duties, often by underreporting the amount of goods they imported into Livomo, and they rarely took a hard line against people who tried to smuggle things into Tuscany. Bribery of customs officers was pervasive.
80 Liberty and licentiousness went hand in hand in Livomo.
Constant (and sometimes illicit) cooperation nourished the habits of consensus that reigned in Livomo. In its early days, merchants negotiated directly with local officials over a host of matters by means of supplications. That changed as the number of merchants in the city and, in the eyes of officialdom, the complexity of its affairs grew. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, there were perhaps twenty-three merchants in the city, including brokers. That figure grew to almost 300 businessmen by 1642. nor and the customs director began to canvass merchant opinion, which initially seemed unfavorable to the change. The governor therefore convoked the merchant community to discuss monetary reform and urged them to think carefully about a compromise position. The chaotic meeting broke up without resolutio~.
The governor's account portrays the challenge of managing consensus m LIvorno when every merchant had a voice:
The English and Dutch wanted to be able to negotiate in every kind of currency, including local pieces of eight or doubloons; the Florentines wer_ e soon of two mmds, and likewise the French fell into the same division. Faced with this great confusion (for there were many [merchants] present) and without hope of a genuine resolution, l begged these gentlemen to be satisfied if each nation selected two people to gather the opmwn of their nation and convey to me in writing their view of the matter
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In this case, the opinion of the English and Dutch communities as conveyed by their deputies prevailed. The free circulation of all currencies according to m~r ket prices remained the custom of the port. When historians speak ?f negotiations in the port, they should imagine local officials spendmg hours m the governor's palace or the customs house trying to get the city's premier merchants to agree with one another on matters ranging from technocrat~c best practi~es to fiscal policy. They listened carefully to merchants while trymg to steer discu~ sions in directions that would be amenable to their superiors in Florence. This process of negotiation was ultimately backed by th~ thre~t, rarely voiced, that merchants could take their business elsewhere. But m da1ly practice, norms of consensus were fostered more by the bonds of collaboration and collusion than by geopolitics.
III. lNSTITUfiONS AND CoMMERCIAL THOUGHT
Livorno provides an example of how organizational dynamics sha~e_d an. important concept of early modem political economy. When the MediCI decided to transform Livorno's infrastructure and legislative framework, the term "free port" signified merely a "port with privileges." It referred to the ability of foreigners to settle in Livomo regardless of ethnicity. The phrase acquired a "general notion of unrestrained liberty" as well as a precise rubric of policies through memoranda produced according to local institutional Jogics. 83 The state was implicated in these institutions and indeed had created them, but it was not necessarily either their driving force or capable of directing their development. Historians of political economy, focused on concerns about imperial rivalry or "taming the passions" of subjects, should direct their attention to institutions as well. 84 While those themes were crucial for introducing cultural and intellectual elites to the problem of economic growth, much writing on commercial matters during the seventeenth century took place with more practical aims in view. Historians have often linked free ports to the purposive intervention of the state in the economy and the aggressive commercial competition of the mercantilist era. It is more accurate to view the evolution of free ports as part of the haphazard development of institutions for regulating economic life, of bodies instituted to serve the state's new commercial goals but readily slipping beyond their grasp: in the case ofLivomo, the Customs Office and the Governor's Office. The system of supplications was deeply embedded in the larger structure of the Medici's organization and use of commercial information. Contrary to some historiography that has glorified the efficiency of early modern information management, neither the central government nor the local bureaucracies in Livorno had the capacity to utilize their archives effectively for most commercial matters.85 Supplications were an important vehicle for discussion about political economy precisely because the state lacked a body for handling similar material. The state machinery for processing supplications was not adept at calibrating Tuscan commercial strategy; the system was erected to make judicial decisions rather than to revise ongoing projects. The central government rarely issued follow-ups or excavated information from its archives. There were no routine inquiries into commerce and no forums for debating industrial goals. Instead, when merchants or artisans crafted a supplication over a particular ques-· the Customs Office and the Governor's Office were responsible for distiOn, . 11 .
I' t covering precedents in the records of their chancellery, gn mg supp Ican s on the details of their requests, and offering whatever thoughts occurred to ~hem on the case at hand. To facilitate their tasks, offices kept books of rescnpts that eserved the grand dukes' decisions in previous matters and mdexed Important ~~siness by subject. The meticulousness of their record keeping should not ~e exaggerated, however, and information gathering relied more on face-to-face discussion than on archival research. . .
The supplication process generated thousands of memoranda ( memona~t ~. It is important to distinguish this genre from other forn:s ofwntmg about poht1~al economy, such as published pamphlets or legal treatises. ~he m.emor~dum Investigated questions offact and only rarely offered theoretical discussions. As a result, their writers usually progressed from the particular to the general, from the merits of the case at hand to a general approach to the issue. Moreover, before offering his opinion, the writer usually presented a list of precedents that .bore on the decision. Of course, due to the disorganization of the archives, the hst of precedents was often incomplete and sometimes done by memory. ~ost importantly, memoranda were set in a policy process. They were composed m response to a privy secretary's request for more information and were supposed to .form the grounds for a decision. Because the genre was so coherent, a~ ambitious writer could also use his brief strategically, as a platform for showcasmg h1s Ideas or to urge a new departure in policy.
. . The signal importance of the memorandum for political economy m Livo.rno may be established by comparing it to the larger universe of economic w~ting. Ducal secretaries regularly received information in the form of news, digests, and the letters of agents who had standing orders to report on commercial developments. Take, for instance, Jan Vander Neesen, a seventeenth-century. Flemish man investigating the possibility of establishing direct commerc1~l t1~s between Livorno and the Indies. Van der Neesen delved into the orgamzat10n of the Dutch East India Company, transmitted news about trade, and forwarded books on navigation to his contacts in Florence. 86 Officials in Livorno its~lf also collected economic information. The captain of the port sent almost da1ly briefs to Florence detailing the provenance and cargos of ships that arrived in Livorno. His reports served an essentially military and political purpos~, to m?nitor the armaments passing through the port. The Health Board transmitted stmilar information for ships arriving with suspect health patents to prevent the spread of plague to the port. In addition, every year the Customs Office prepared a surnrnary balance sheet in order to track government revenues. have been exploited by modem historians to trace the development of Livomo 's trade, although they served other purposes in the seventeenth century. Only the customs balance was occasionally used in contemporary discussions of the free port.
Officials had difficulty exploiting the torrent of information that came their wa.y. Often it was buried in the personal archives of the recipient. Busy secretanes rarely dug through their records to build a picture of trading opportunities in Holland (for example) or to compile trends for the price of grain in Livomo. They did not use their archives to assess ties between Livomo and its increasingly estranged Tuscan hinterland; to analyze the contradictory relationship between policies that favored the port of deposit versus those that favored maritime expansion; or to track the policies of rival ports, apart from taking note of ma~or legislation issued by competitors. Instead, secretaries almost always asked the1r usual correspondents to pen responses to specific questions even when they could have excavated such information from their own troves of letters, memos, and news reports. Most everyday business consisted of just such questions and answers, since it would have been impossible to index all of the proper names mentioned in letters, let alone all of the subject matters. This procedure meant that m~y memoranda merely rehashed data or perspectives that had been presented p1ecemeal over previous correspondence. Like the most advanced of their contemporaries in Venice or Spain, Tuscan secretaries organized their files according to strategic objectives and drew upon them when producing general state~ent.s of policy. 87 Most commercial information escaped their principles of organ1zatwn, however. Crucial matters pertaining to the free port were delegated to local officials working through memoranda.
Another reason the memorandum reigned supreme was the absence of published treatises on political economy in seventeenth-century Tuscany. The late Renaissance had witnessed a florescence of writing on commercial matters. The (M1lan, 2011 ) , 55-fJ7. These works emphasize the quality of the Medici information network. I agree, but I would observe that its translation into policy outcomes was effic1ent only for "hot" political or commercial affairs.
87 Giuseppe Pansini, "Le segreterie del principato mediceo," in Carteggio universale di (I 542-1613) (Florence, 1975 (Florence, [ 1905 ); Marcello Fantoni, "Dalla provmc1a alia capitate: Gli Usimbardi di Colle alia corte medicea," in Colle di Val d' Elsa:
Diocesi e citta tra '500 e '600, ed. Pietro Nencini (Castelfiorentino, 1994) , 117-37.
Managing Free Trade in 8arly Moaern curup~ J~J rnost original writer was undoubtedly Antonio Serra, whose 1613 treatise~ alyzed the difference between industrial economies and agricultural economies. Serra showed that industry enjoyed increasing returns to scale, whereas cultivation suffered from diminishing returns to scale, and his work, virtually unknown in the seventeenth century, had a profound impact on Enlightenment thinkers .
But Serra was just one of several Italian thinkers who applied historical or an~ alytic reason to the sources of state wealth. Th~ Tuscan ~em~~o Davanzat~ wrote treatises on money and agriculture, and h1s cornpatnot F1hppo Sassettl wrote a discourse on commerce and port cities. The most influential author of the late Renaissance, however, was Giovanni Botero. As a secretary to the prominent Borromeo family of Milan, Botero had first-hand knowledge of the political machinations that drove European politics. He incorporated his insights into The Reason of State, which was published in 1589 and saw many subsequent editions. 88 The problem was that commercial writings dealt with matters that were patently too political for Tuscan subjects to publish. Caroline .Callard h~s shown that by the early seventeenth century, virtually all pubhcatwn touchmg upon political life in Tuscany came to a halt as the Medici grand dukes squelched public discussion of the arcana imperii. 89 Perhaps becau.se B.otero .had succeeded so well in marrying it to reason of state, commercml d1scuss1on could not be framed in a politically neutral way. In addition, the fecklessness of representative institutions meant that there was little incentive to court popular opinion by publishing on political economy. The major representative bodies in Tuscany were the forty-eight-person Senate and the Council of200. The members of both were handpicked by the grand duke, but these were honors that carried no real power. The supremacy of the Medici and the narrow political class discouraged publication of commercial reflection. Supplications therefore provided the context. for many discussions about political economy. The long sunset of the MediCI dynasty began in the early eighteenth century when it became clear that the last prince of the house, Gian Gastone (r. 1723-37) , would be unable to prod~ce an heir. Tuscans began publishing texts asserting the independence ofthe1r republic in a failed effort to forestall a foreign succession. 90 They also started publishing economic texts again, first with Sallustio Bandini's Discourse on the Maremma ( 1739). The grand duchy went on to have one of the most vib~antexplorations of political economy in Enlightenment Europe. 91
D~fferent mstltutional arrangements may well have changed the nature of poht1cal economy in Medici Tuscany. Other countries had more regular feedhac~ mechan. isms for linking policy and commercial strategy. For example, in Vemce the .~mque Savi alia Mercanzia (Trade Board) played an active role in vettmg pet1t10ns on economic matters and occasionally proposed new measures.92 Under the system of intendants supervised by Colbert, France had a cadre of.agent~ well trained in the mercantile arts, in gathering information, and ~n supenntendmg state-backed projects. 93 The presence of representative bodIes mattered, too. The Collegi in Genoa were the major venues in which the " navalist" faction sought to implement their policy of commercial expansion. T~ey unleashed a. flurry of publications in the mid-seventeenth century glorifymg the mercantile and seafaring identity of their city in order to win public sup~ort. 94 The English ruling class was larger and more permeable than Genoa 's, and m a state of rapid evolution owing to economic expansion and political controversy. Commercial writers employed back-room dealing as well as extensive pamphleteering to influence Crown and Parliament. 95 special zone within a city that otherwise remained untouched by free trade, as in Genoa. The port of Tangier was free only for certain trade routes since the English mandated that goods shipped from there to other English territories be carried aboard English vessels. The ports in the Caribbean exempted only those goods that did not compete with a mother country's domestic industries. Scholars have attributed the diversity of free ports largely to the geopolitical situation of each. This explanation carries some weight in accounting for differences between cities such as Marseilles and Livorno, or between European and Caribbean ports. It has less traction with regard to the variety of free ports among Italian states. Italian free ports shared a general geopolitical outlook: most of them belonged to rich but small, second-rate powers at the crossroads of Mediterranean trade. But none experienced the success of Livorno.
The policy process deeply affected the articulation of free ports. Despite similar legislative intent, new policies were implemented in contexts very different from that of the Tuscan port. Most observers attributed Livorno 's success to the Livornina. Ferdinanda 's legislation was recalled in laws issued for Nice ( 1648), Modena ( 1652), Genoa ( 1654), Messina ( 1719), and Naples ( 1739) .
99 It also had an important impact on legislation in Marseilles and Ancona. The military engineer Sir Henry Sheeres complained that Tangier, declared a free port by Charles ll in 1662, lacked a defined "constitution" laying out its actual privileges like the one Livomo had.
100 As we have seen, however, ascribing Livorno 's success to its formal legislation is a gross oversimplification. Livorno 's free port was a complex of formal and informal practices embedded in a larger institutional matrix. It was nourished not only by Ferdinanda's legislation but above all by the lack of effective central oversight and the collaborative ties that bonded merchants and officials in Livomo. The ensemble of administrative practices, precedents, and assumptions that constituted the free port of Livorno could not be copied simply by lowering customs duties or by welcoming foreign settlers.
Contemporary observers often failed to appreciate the institutional complexity of free ports, with important consequences for policy as well as for how Enlightenment thinkers handled them during the formative period of European political economy. In 1743 the Neapolitan economist Carlo Antonio Broggia accused Italians of having "prostituted" their commerce to foreigners through their establishment of free ports. 
